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In studies of religious collective ac-
tors, the role of religion as a potential 
agent of social change has often been 
downplayed in favour of an emphasis 
on religion as a reactionary social force. 
Whereas recent studies of Christian or-
ganizations and movements challenge 
this rather one-dimensional under-
standing of religion, it still seems to be 
the dominant approach in studies of 
Muslim collective action. Muslim organ-
izations and movements are frequently 
explained from a socio-psychological 
point of view, seeing collective action 
as a product of structural strains and psychological discomfort. In other 
words, people participate in Muslim collective action because they are 
poor and unemployed, have no possibilities for political participation, 
or are frustrated over being excluded from Western modernity. As such, 
Muslim collective action is seen primarily as a compensatory reaction 
to structural changes rather than a potential force for change in itself.
While structural strains naturally play a role in the actions of most 
people, this perspective runs the risk of overlooking other important 
factors in Muslim collective action. For instance, in their focus on un-
derlying socio-psychological reasons, 
such approaches often tend to down-
play the individual participants’ own 
perceptions of social change, thereby 
reducing their actions to more or less 
automatic responses to structural 
strains, and overlooking the purposive, 
reflective, and organized dimensions 
of collective action. We argue that a 
micro-level focus on concrete Muslim 
collective actors and their perceptions 
of Islam and social change can contrib-
ute to a more complex understanding 
of the relations between Islam, collec-
tive action, and social change. Yes, peo-
ple might participate in Muslim organi-
zations and movements because they 
are frustrated, poor, or unemployed. 
But they also participate because they 
see this particular kind of action as the 
most relevant and powerful tool for 
changing their situation.
Islam and social change
A new movement of Muslim youth 
organizations, emerging from Egypt 
but spreading to other Middle Eastern 
countries, presents particularly interesting insights on the topic. Urban, 
upper middle-class young people constitute the backbone of this new 
movement. The majority is in their 20s, and most have been to univer-
sity. In order to understand these young people’s perceptions of Islam 
and social change, we have to turn towards the Egyptian account-
ant-turned-preacher Amr Khaled. Amr Khaled started preaching in 
mosques and private clubs in the early 1990s, and today, his shows are 
broadcasted on a number of satellite channels, reaching an audience 
of millions of young Muslims all over the world. He speaks an easily 
understandable Colloquial Arabic rather than the Standard Arabic spo-
ken by traditional shaykhs, and his style is soft and compassionate, not 
disciplinary and strict. While others call his version of Islam “Islam light,” 
he says that his main concern is simply 
to make young people love religion in-
stead of fearing it. Amr Khaled’s ideas 
about Islam appear to have become 
firmly rooted among young Muslims. 
He has become the catalyst for a much 
broader trend, facilitated by the Inter-
net and satellite TV, and showing in the 
growing number of preachers with a 
similar style and message, as well as in 
the establishment of several youth or-
ganizations based on his ideas. 
Social change plays an explicit role in 
the discourses of this new movement. 
According to Amr Khaled, Islam is not only about praying five times a 
day and wearing the hijab the correct way, and da‘wa is not just a call to 
live by these rules. Islam is about changing and improving yourself and 
your community, and da‘wa is a call to actively engage in this change. 
The overall goal is not only a stronger Muslim individual, but a stronger 
Muslim society, a renaissance of the Muslim world. As such, two equally 
important strategies of the movement are community engagement and 
individual empowerment, both motivated and shaped by the Muslim 
faith. Each in their own way, the different activities of the organizations 
demonstrate this intimate connection 
between individual empowerment and 
community engagement. 
Let’s do it ourselves!
In his TV programme Sunna‘ al-Haya 
(Life-Makers), Amr Khaled called for 
young people to engage in their com-
munity: “Guys, don’t wait for something 
to happen. Let’s do it ourselves!” One of 
his first projects was the collection and 
distribution of second-hand clothes in 
poor areas. Thousands of young peo-
ple participated, and in the following 
months, volunteer work among young 
people increased. This call for par-
ticipation in society is articulated as a 
moral obligation: A good Muslim is an 
active Muslim.
According to the young, one of the 
main challenges in their society is 
poverty and poverty-related problems 
such as illiteracy, unemployment, and 
illnesses. They see social welfare activi-
ties as logical solutions to these prob-
lems. In a Muslim context, this focus 
on poverty and social welfare is noth-
ing new. The duty to give to the poor, zakat, is one of the five pillars 
in Islam. Likewise, activities such as taking care of orphans and poor 
families range high in the extensive system for rewarding good deeds, 
thawab. However, the duty to help the poor has often manifested itself 
in rather traditional charity activities. Few organizations have engaged 
in more long-term development activities seeking to empower people 
to break out of their poverty. 
The new youth organizations introduce a different approach. This is 
not just about collecting thawab to ensure one’s own place in Para-
dise; it is about developing the Muslim world, creating a renaissance. 
Here, buzz words such as capacity-building and sustainable develop-
ment are often heard; several of the organizations run vocational train-
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models for the young people, promoting the ideal of a Muslim profes-
sional. As one lecturer emphasized: “When I say that the lecture starts 
at six, six-o-one you’re late. When I say that you have to attend three 
out of four lectures to pass, if you only attend two, you have failed. 
There are no excuses. This is what it takes to be a 
Muslim professional.” 
Hence, Islam clearly plays a significant role 
when it comes to empowerment of the young en-
gaged in these organizations. The kind of religion 
communicated to the participants is not so much 
about rituals and theological doctrine. Instead, 
Islam is the underlying motivation and what 
provides the general guidelines for the modern 
individual, whether it concerns major choices in 
life or daily interaction with friends, family, and 
colleagues. If understood and practiced the right 
way, Islam will help the individual achieve his or 
her goals and become an active participant in 
society. As a leader in one organization told me: 
“Our purpose is not to spread Islam—it’s already 
there. Our purpose is to help people grow stronger. The Prophet was a 
strong man, useful to his nation. He’s our idol.”
Perspectives
It is obvious that participants in the new Muslim youth organizations 
articulate an intimate relation between Islam and change. Society 
needs change, individuals need change, and Islam is the tool to obtain 
this change. Problems such as poverty, unemployment, and apathy are 
seen as moral and social problems, whose solutions must be sought in 
the individual and in the community. With their faith as motivation and 
guiding light, young people seek to address these problems through 
the interrelated and mutually reinforcing strategies of community en-
gagement and individual empowerment, and with the stated goal of 
contributing to the renaissance of the Muslim nation. 
But one thing is how the young people understand social change 
and what they do to implement this change. Another thing is what 
consequences this will have on a structural level. In other words, and 
paraphrasing Foucault, the young might know what they do, but they 
do not know what “what they do” will do. An interesting question in 
this respect is whether their social engagement will develop into more 
formal political participation, thereby perhaps changing the current 
political structures in the Middle East. Given the novelty of Muslim 
youth organizations, such questions cannot be answered definitively 
at this point, and there is a need for more long-term studies. However, 
based on our own very preliminary observations, we propose three 
possible answers.
First of all, one could argue that these youth organizations might 
become breeding grounds for formal political actors. Obviously these 
organizations strengthen skills that can be characterized as essential to 
political engagement—skills such as argumentation techniques, team-
work, and critical thinking. However, in their current form they are char-
acterised by an explicit lack of formal political engagement. The young 
see their participation as an attempt to address social and moral injus-
tice, not political injustice, and they take no interest in using formal po-
litical channels to gain influence. This could lead one to conclude that 
such organizations can end up hindering formal political participation 
by diverting potential actors from the political scene, luring them into 
harmless social activities. Finally, a third perspective might see these 
social activities neither as harmless activities nor as run-ups to formal 
political participation but rather as expressions of a whole new kind of 
political engagement, challenging the often corrupt and dysfunctional 
political system by insisting on different forms and channels of partici-
pation. But regardless of which—if any—of these answers will turn out 
to be true, the new Muslim youth organizations present some interest-
ing micro-level examples of how human beings understand religion as 
intimately intertwined with social change and how they use their reli-
gion as a relevant and powerful tool to obtain such change.
ing centres and organize awareness campaigns, some receive training 
from secular development NGOs, and many are getting involved in mi-
crofinance activities. In addition to this, the organizations also engage 
in traditional charity activities. They distribute food-bags and blankets, 
and they invite people to celebrate religious holi-
days. But they seem to be very aware of the limi-
tations of such activities. As a young man put it: 
“In the end, poverty will not be solved by giving 
out 3,000 bags. You need to change the minds of 
people.” 
This hints at another important aspect, under-
lying the youth’s approach to social welfare: All 
change must start with the individual. As such, in-
dividual empowerment is a key component in the 
organizations’ social welfare activities. What the 
poor need is not just money and material goods; 
they need a direction in their life, and this direction 
is Islam. Through education, training, and conver-
sations, the young seek to convey their ideas of 
a good Muslim lifestyle to the poor. Combining 
secular development tools with Islamic ideals and guidelines, they em-
phasize the importance of education, hard work, and good morals. 
Through their engagement in social welfare activities, they not only 
try to empower the poor—by default they also empower themselves. 
Almost everybody says that their engagement in this work had strength-
ened their skills in areas such as project planning, management, and 
communication. The young do not just interpret these benefits as com-
mon consequences of involvement in any kind of community work. 
Rather, they see them as the consequences of a specific Muslim ap-
proach to community work, emphasizing efficiency, organization, and 
strategic thinking as important qualities in any good Muslim.
Thus, religion is what initially motivates the young people to engage 
in social welfare activities: To be a good Muslim is to do something 
for others. But, combined with secular development ideas, religion is 
also what provides the guidelines for how to do something for oth-
ers. Poverty is not fought through the random distribution of zakat, 
but through individual empowerment, including education, vocational 
training, and moral strengthening. Finally, by providing concrete ben-
efits in terms of strengthened personal capacities, religion is also what 
makes them keep doing something for others. 
You have to start with yourself 
Social welfare activities are not the only concern of the youth or-
ganizations. Many also engage in so-called human and career develop-
ment courses. Whereas the engagement in social welfare activities is 
motivated by a wish to fight poverty in general, young people engage 
in these courses in an attempt to solve more youth-specific problems 
such as unemployment, apathy, and poor quality of higher education. 
Successful managers in multinational companies and university profes-
sors teach courses in topics such as time management, presentation 
skills, leadership, business and ethics, offered to university students for 
free or at a very low price since both organizers and lecturers work as 
volunteers.
The concrete goal of these organizations is to prepare young people 
for a professional and adult life. On the more general level, the organi-
zations wish to create a more effective and responsible generation of 
youth, able to participate in society, and thereby contributing to the 
renaissance of the Muslim nation. Thus, the courses become yet an-
other concrete manifestation of the relation between social change 
and individual empowerment: If you want to change society, you have 
to start with the individual. And most importantly: You have to start 
with yourself. 
Though most courses offered are based on American management 
theories, Islam plays a significant role in both practices and discourses. 
In fact, Islam and modern management are seen as mutually reinforc-
ing. Through the introduction of the ideal of a so-called “Muslim pro-
fessional,” the effective businessman’s strategies are merged with the 
values and morals of a good Muslim. A Muslim professional is someone 
who dresses properly, works efficiently, and has high moral standards. 
The youth organizations are managed after the model of multinational 
companies, but in the tight schedule, there is time for religious lectures 
and prayers. In fact, religious commitment and practice is expected of 
the organizations’ members. The lecturers and organizers act as role 
“… The Prophet 
was a strong man, 
useful to his nation. 
He’s our idol.”
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